The parliamentary elections in Israel were a major test of public confidence in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Israelis went to the polls in the aftermath of the events of October 7, 2023, the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, the confrontation with Iran, and increasingly strained relations with several international partners. The composition of the next government will decide the direction of Israel’s political and strategic development.
Turnout was exceptionally high – the Central Elections Committee put it at 77.7%, the highest since 1999. The main contest unfolded between Netanyahu’s Likud party and an opposition camp led by Gadi Eisenkot, the leader of the centrist Yashar party. His potential allies include the parties of Naftali Bennett, Yair Lapid (who had shared a rotating premiership in 2021-22), and other parties opposed to the incumbent coalition.
According to updated exit polls conducted by three major TV networks, the opposition bloc is projected to secure 47 seats, Netanyahu’s allies 54, and Arab parties outside either camp 19. Likud nevertheless remains the largest individual party, while other projections are more favorable to the right-wing bloc. The official results are expected to be published on November 4. For now, one thing is evident: Neither side has secured a clear parliamentary majority.
Political mobilization
The turnout reflects a profound political mobilization within Israeli society. Over the past several years, decisions made by the leadership have become increasingly intertwined with questions of personal security, economic well-being, and the future of individual families. As a result, even citizens who previously remained relatively disengaged from politics have become more actively involved.
The events of October 7, 2023 were the decisive catalyst for this transformation. The failure of the national security system severely undermined confidence in the political leadership, and the subsequent wars failed to produce lasting national unity around the government. Instead, they intensified questions of political accountability, the human and economic costs of military decisions, and the absence of a convincing strategy for ending the conflicts. Even supporters of a hardline security approach have grown disillusioned with its effectiveness.
Socioeconomic pressures have also played an important role. Rising military expenditure, the high cost of living, housing difficulties, and prolonged reserve military service have shown the people the price of continuing instability. Particularly contentious has been the exemption of sections of the ultra-Orthodox community from military service, while other segments of society bear the burden.
Israel’s deteriorating international standing has further compounded these challenges. Disagreements with traditional European partners over the war in Gaza, developments in the West Bank, and the policies pursued by far-right members of the government are leaving the country with less and less room for diplomatic maneuvers. Some voters increasingly blame the government for growing diplomatic isolation and economic risks.
The high turnout was not just against Netanyahu. Right-wing voters were also highly mobilized, as was the Arab electorate, whose parties achieved a notable result. Nevertheless, the elections suggest that the existing political situation is no longer widely seen as sustainable.
The coalition struggle
In Israeli politics, electoral success does not necessarily translate into political power. In the 120-seat Knesset, a governing coalition requires the support of at least 61 members, a threshold that neither of the two main political camps is so far projected to reach. The decisive struggle will now move to negotiations between parties.
After the official results are released, President Isaac Herzog will consult parliamentary factions and entrust the task of forming a government to the candidate considered most capable of securing a majority. The initial period for coalition negotiations is 28 days, with a possible extension of up to 14 days. If these efforts fail, another member of the Knesset may be given 28 days to form a government. Subsequently, members of parliament would have 21 days to nominate an alternative candidate with the support of at least 61 legislators, who would then receive a further 14 days to complete the process. Should this final attempt also fail, the Knesset would be dissolved and new elections called.
Under these circumstances, smaller parties have far more power than their number of seats would suggest. In exchange for supporting a coalition, they may demand ministerial appointments, budgetary commitments, and significant policy concessions. Netanyahu’s camp will have to seek additional support beyond its traditional allies, while the opposition faces the difficult task of reconciling the positions of centrists, right-wing opponents of Netanyahu, and more liberal parties.
Arab parties, which are projected to hold 19 seats, could become particularly important. Eisenkot and some of his potential coalition partners, however, have ruled out including them in the government. External parliamentary support or abstention during a confidence vote could theoretically alter the balance, but this would require politically sensitive compromises from the centrist camp.
Netanyahu’s extensive experience in coalition-building gives him considerable opportunities to negotiate with smaller parties and persuade individual political actors to abandon competing alliances. Even if he fails to assemble a majority, he will remain in office as caretaker prime minister until a new government is formed. His political position has undoubtedly weakened, but this does not yet amount to his removal from power.
The Netanyahu factor
Netanyahu entered these elections with a loyal electoral base intact, but with substantially weakened support beyond the right-wing camp. National security has always been his central political argument. Yet the consequences of October 7 and the prolonged military campaigns have seriously damaged his reputation, raising questions about the effectiveness of his leadership.
With this in mind, reports of preparations for a new military operation against Iran shortly before the elections deserve particular attention. Axios reported on discussions between Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump, the Financial Times described preparations for a large-scale strike in early October, and CNN reported on Israeli efforts to secure American support. According to these accounts, the Trump administration prefers to avoid another major escalation ahead of the US elections scheduled for November 3. Netanyahu denied reports that Trump prevented a planned Israeli attack, and some of the reported details have also been disputed by Israeli media.
A swift and successful military operation against Iran could have unified a substantial part of society around Likud, restored Netanyahu’s image as a decisive defender of national security, and pushed criticism of his domestic policies into the background. While this does not prove that a strike was being planned for electoral purposes, the potential political benefits are obvious.
On the other hand, a short war against Iran would have been an extremely risky gamble. Iranian retaliation, the involvement of Tehran’s regional allies, additional pressure on Israel’s missile defense systems, and potential disruption of global energy markets could have produced another crisis of public confidence. The combination of American constraints and unpredictable military consequences appears to have prevented this from happening before the election.
Ultimately, the election took place without a major military development capable of fundamentally shifting votes. Should Netanyahu remain in power, the most likely outcome would be the continuation of his hardline approach towards Iran and aligned armed groups. Continued dependence on far-right coalition partners could push this policy in an even more confrontational direction. Even so, Israel would still have to take Washington’s position into account, given the importance of American support for major military operations.
The Eisenkot alternative
Gadi Eisenkot, who served as chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces from 2015 to 2019, has emerged as Netanyahu’s principal political alternative. His main advantage lies in offering a change of leadership without abandoning the centrality of national security. For voters dissatisfied with the incumbent prime minister but unwilling to embrace a fundamental ideological shift, this is an appealing compromise. Eisenkot presents himself as a centrist, institutionally minded political figure with extensive experience in military leadership.
Particular emphasis in his political program is placed on soldiers, reservists, and their families. His party has proposed expanding housing, tax, and education benefits, increasing social assistance, and raising the remuneration of conscripts by 15%, with a 50% increase for combat soldiers in their third year of service. These proposals have the potential to attract military families that have long demanded more equitable social protection. It would, however, be an exaggeration to suggest that Israel’s entire security establishment supports a single candidate.
Another important part of Eisenkot’s electoral base consists of citizens disillusioned with the governing coalition’s style of leadership, its disputes with state institutions, and its dependence on far-right parties. Eisenkot promises to restore confidence in government, broaden the principle of compulsory military or national service, and reduce divisions within society. His political appeal is centered on effective governance rather than ideological transformation.
On the Palestinian question, however, fundamental changes are unlikely. Eisenkot opposes the establishment of a fully independent Palestinian state under present conditions and insists on maintaining Israeli control over essential security matters. Although some Jewish parties support the two-state solution, the core of a new coalition would most likely consist of nationally oriented parties. Nevertheless, Eisenkot’s criticism of illegal settlement outposts and settler violence suggests that a change in political methods is possible.
There is much more room for change in foreign policy. A departure from a government of far-right politicians whose rhetoric has complicated Israel’s relations with European partners and Arab states could, in itself, help reduce diplomatic tensions. A more pragmatic cabinet would have the opportunity to restore working relationships, ease Israel’s international isolation, and pursue a gradual normalization of relations across the region.
However, a more restrained diplomatic approach should not be mistaken for the abandonment of military deterrence. Eisenkot regards Iran’s nuclear program, its missile capabilities, and its network of regional allies as serious threats to national security. Under his leadership, Israel would likely maintain a firm policy of containment while seeking closer coordination with Washington and a more balanced combination of military and diplomatic instruments. This approach could reduce certain risks, but it would not eliminate the underlying confrontation.
The main dilemma emerging from the election is that many Israelis who voted against Netanyahu expect greater stability and a reduction in regional tensions, yet the country’s security environment and the positions of opposition leaders themselves impose significant constraints on any rapid political compromise. Eisenkot could change the style of governance and improve the atmosphere of Israel’s relations with the outside world, but he cannot guarantee peace. Netanyahu, by contrast, would be more likely to continue along the current path.
Until the official results are published and coalition negotiations concluded, it is impossible to predict with confidence who will become the next prime minister. The elections have nevertheless exposed profound public fatigue with a prolonged period of crisis and the absence of a clear political mandate for overcoming it.
The ultimate outcome will determine far more than the composition of the next government. It may also shape the future trajectory of the entire Middle East, influencing whether the region moves towards a period of cautious stabilization or enters another phase of escalating confrontation.