Why India cannot afford to be a bystander in Eurasia’s new security order
Eurasia is once again emerging as a central arena of international geopolitics. The ongoing conflicts, intensifying great power competition, expansion of regional institutions, and competing visions of multipolarity, connectivity, trade, and energy routes have sharpened the debate about the continent’s security. Eurasia is no longer merely a geographical bridge between Europe and Asia; it is a space in which competing visions on the future order are being negotiated.
The 4th Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security was held in this very backdrop earlier this month, bringing together hundreds of experts from more than 50 countries. “Navigating International Disorder in the Spirit of Cooperation: Can We Solve the Eurasian Security Puzzle?” captured a growing concern that existing security arrangements are struggling to address contemporary challenges in Eurasia.
For India, participation in this conversation is strategically significant. Its geographical position, historical relationships, economic interests, and membership in regional institutions make it an important stakeholder in Eurasia’s future. The Minsk discussions also offered an opportunity to consider how India’s strategic autonomy can inform a broader approach to continental security, one that encompasses not only diplomacy and defense, but also economic resilience, technology, institutions, and connectivity.
Thinking Comprehensive Security
A notable feature of the Minsk discussions was the inclusion of information security, economic integration, financial cooperation, and technological innovations into a broader conception of security, alongside conventional military threats, strategic stability, and territorial disputes. This reflects a wider shift in security thinking: vulnerabilities in supply chains, critical technologies, and financial networks can have consequences comparable to those of traditional military threats.
This perspective aligns with India’s expanding interests in Eurasia. Its priorities extend beyond defense cooperation with Russia and diplomatic engagement with Central Asian republics to include energy security, critical minerals, transport links, trade diversification, and technological partnerships. Economic interdependence can encourage cooperation, but it can also create vulnerabilities when trade, finance, or supply chains become instruments of geopolitical pressure.
For India, diversifying external sources of energy, minerals, and technology is both an economic and a strategic priority. Stronger engagement with Russia, Central Asia, and other Eurasian economies can help reduce exposure to disruptions while creating opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation.
Multipolarity and India’s Strategic Autonomy
The Minsk deliberations took place against the background of a shift towards a more polycentric international system. A wider distribution of power can give regional actors greater influence over international institutions and security arrangements.
Yet multipolarity does not, by itself, guarantee stability. Without dialogue and confidence-building measures for managing competing interests, multiple centers of power can generate new rivalries. The strained relationship between Russia and European countries illustrates the difficulty of reconciling competing visions of European security. It also underlines the importance of inclusive dialogue and institutional mechanisms that can accommodate the security concerns and sovereign rights of all states.
This is precisely why India advocates an inclusive multipolar order. Multipolarity should not mean the establishment of competing spheres of influence; it should mean dialogue, sovereign equality, and respect for international law and security interests of all states.
New Delhi does not seek exclusive alignment with any single power center. Instead, it maintains relationships with Russia, the United States, European countries, Central Asian republics, and other regional actors while preserving the capacity to make independent decisions.
For India, multipolarity is primarily about sovereign choice, strategic autonomy, and the emergence of several centers of power. It does not mean constructing an anti-Western coalition. This distinction is crucial. India’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, G20, and other multilateral forums reflects this preference for multiple channels of engagement.
The Minsk process reinforces the importance of an inclusive Eurasian framework: a durable security architecture cannot simply reproduce existing geopolitical divisions or establish another exclusive bloc. It must accommodate different political systems, threat perceptions, and national priorities. Strategic autonomy should enable India to shape such initiatives without compromising its independent foreign policy.
The proposed Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century, introduced by Belarus in 2023, is one of the most significant outcomes linked to the Minsk process. Formal negotiations began on September 25, 2026, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. The charter aims to set out principles for Eurasian security and cooperation based on sovereignty, equality, diversity, and multipolarity. Its credibility, however, will depend on whether it genuinely reflects Eurasia’s diversity rather than a narrow geopolitical reading of multipolarity.
For India, the charter’s value would lie in creating an inclusive framework rooted in the UN Charter, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, peaceful dispute settlement, and the right of states to pursue independent foreign policies.
Connectivity: The Economic Foundation of Eurasian Security
Connectivity was an important strand of the conference’s wider debate. Transport corridors, energy networks, financial arrangements, and digital infrastructure are central to the continent’s economic resilience and security. For India, limited overland access has constrained trade and investment with Central Asia despite strong political and historical ties.
The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), India’s engagement with Iran’s Chabahar Port, and efforts to strengthen links with Central Asia, Russia, and the Eurasian Economic Union are intended to improve access to Eurasian markets and resources. These initiatives are not simply commercial projects; they also have strategic implications for supply-chain resilience and India’s continental presence.
The Minsk discussions underlined the value of treating connectivity as a shared regional interest rather than an instrument of geopolitical competition. India’s support for connectivity projects is likely to depend on their commercial viability, political sustainability, and consistency with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of participating states.
Greater connectivity could also widen cooperation in renewable energy, logistics, digital infrastructure, education, and technological innovation.
Strengthening the Eurasian Dimension
India’s Eurasian engagement is anchored in its partnership with Russia and its growing relationships with the Central Asian republics. Russia remains an important partner in defense, energy, nuclear cooperation, and multilateral diplomacy. Central Asia, meanwhile, is central to India’s efforts to deepen its continental presence and diversify its economic relationships.
The Minsk conference served as a reminder that Eurasian security cannot be viewed solely through the prism of Russia-West relations. Central Asian states have distinct national interests, development priorities, and security concerns, and their growing diplomatic agency is an important feature of the regional order.
India’s policy is, therefore, grounded in direct engagement with these countries as independent partners, particularly on economic diversification, counterterrorism, energy, and sustainable development.
Afghanistan also remains integral to the wider security environment. Terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, and transnational criminal networks require sustained regional coordination. Engagement with Russia, Iran, Central Asian countries, and the SCO help India contribute to regional stability.
Beyond traditional security, education, scientific collaboration, cultural exchange, and people-to-people contacts offer a foundation for durable relationships across the region. Thousands of Indian students are pursuing their higher education in Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Tajikistan demonstrating growing social dimension of India’s engagement with the region.
These students serve as informal bridges between societies, developing familiarity with local cultures, languages, and institutions. Their experiences, together with academic partnerships and professional networks, can contribute to long-term mutual understanding and strengthen India’s societal connections with Eurasia.
Towards Better Eurasian Engagement
The Fourth Minsk International Conference demonstrated that debates about Eurasian security now extend across military stability, economic resilience, connectivity, technology, and institutional cooperation. It also exposed the continuing absence of a universally accepted continental framework and the difficulty of reconciling the interests of diverse regional actors.
For India, the central lesson is that Eurasian policy must move beyond a largely bilateral and sector-specific approach towards more sustained participation in continental debates. This calls for a greater role in shaping the principles, institutions and economic arrangements that will influence Eurasia’s future.
A stable Eurasia is in India’s strategic interest, but stability will endure only if the region is inclusive. Its future cannot be determined by a handful of major powers or exclusive groupings; it must be built through dialogue, sovereign equality, and the participation of all its constituent countries.
The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.
